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I. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Is Jared Neumeier entitled to his attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to 
Idaho Code §§ 12-120(1), 12-120(3), 12-121, and Appellate Rules 40 and 41? 
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 A. Nature of the Case. 
This is a medical collection matter.  Defendant Jared Neumeier was sued 
for payment of a medical bill that was never submitted to his insurance, and which he 
first learned about only two days before suit was filed.  But by that time, according to his 
doctor, Eric Baird, MD, and Plaintiff Medical Recovery Services (“MRS”), it was too 
late.  Even though Dr. Baird later recognized the error, submitted the bill to Neumeier’s 
insurance and waived the remaining balance, MRS refused to dismiss the case.  Judgment 
was entered in Neumeier’s favor below by Hon. Stephen J. Clark, Magistrate Judge and 
affirmed on appeal by Hon. Joel E. Tingey, District Judge.  
 B. Statement of the Facts. 
On November 30, 2012, Neumeier visited Dr. Baird for a colonoscopy.  He 
provided his Blue Cross insurance information, was seen by Dr. Baird, and then left his 
office.  (R., p. 19). 
Neumeier did not hear anything more about the colonoscopy until well over 
two years later.  On Saturday, May 16, 2015, upon returning from a two week-long 
Panama Canal cruise, Neumeier opened his mailbox and discovered a letter, dated April 
27, 2015, containing MRS’s Complaint in this matter with an attached Notice Under 
Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.  The Complaint asserted that “[d]espite the 
plaintiff’s requests and demands, and without offering any reason or objection to the bill, 
the defendant has failed to pay the indebtedness in full.”  (R., p. 9).  Neumeier’s first 
 
 
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF - 3 
 
thought was that it must be some kind of fraud or phishing scam, since he had never 
received any notice from either Dr. Baird or MRS stating that any amount was owing on 
any account.  (R., p. 98-99). 
On Monday, May 18, 2015, Neumeier left work early and visited Dr. 
Baird’s office to let them know that someone was using their name in a scam.  The office 
looked up the account on their system, told Neumeier it was not a scam, and stated that it 
was “too late” as it had “already gone to collections.”  Baird’s office also noticed that 
they had never billed Neumeier’s insurance.  (R., p. 99). 
Unbeknownst to Neumeier, MRS filed the Complaint that same day, on 
May 18, 2015.  
Neumeier called MRS the next morning on May 19, 2015 and tried to 
explain that he had never received any notice and that his insurance was never billed, but 
was told that it was “too late for them to do anything about it,” because it had “already 
gone to the attorney.”  Neumeier then called MRS’s attorney’s office, who told him that 
he now owed $1,800.  (R., p. 99-100).  
As Neumeier dug deeper, he learned that Dr. Baird had sent demand letters 
for payment, but to the wrong address.  Contrary to the assertion in the Complaint, 
Neumeier never received a single request or demand for payment until he opened his 
mailbox on Saturday, May 16, 2015.  Not only did both Dr. Baird’s office and MRS 
continue to use the wrong address over time (sending mail to “Skyline” instead of 
Neumeier’s address on “Skyview”), they never even attempted to contact Neumeier by 
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telephone.  (R., p. 19). 
After hiring an attorney, and two months into the lawsuit, Dr. Baird finally 
submitted the bill for the colonoscopy to Neumeier’s insurance, which reduced the total 
amount of the bill to only $42.66, after network savings and insurance payments.  (R., pp. 
19, 22). 
On August 20, 2015, Neumeier received a message from Dr. Baird’s office 
letting him know that they were waiving the balance.  (R., p. 20). 
With no balance owing, Neumeier then presented to MRS the Explanation 
of Benefits and the fact that Dr. Baird had waived the remaining balance, in an effort to 
get the lawsuit dismissed without resorting to summary judgment, but MRS refused.  (R., 
p. 20). 
Neumeier subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss on September 25, 2015.  
MRS countered with an Opposition to Motion to Dismiss on October 27, 2015, in which 
it requested that the court “deny Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and grant summary 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the amount of $0.”  (R., pp. 15, 33).  MRS’s briefing 
made no mention of any claim for prejudgment interest. 
The Magistrate Court treated both parties’ motions as motions for summary 
judgment, and issued an Order on Motion for Summary Judgment on November 23, 2015 
in favor of Neumeier.  (R., p. 47).  The Order stated that “the parties agree that the 
provider is not owed anything at this point and that the provider was primarily 
responsible for the non-payment of the bill by failing to submit the claim to insurance 
 
 
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF - 5 
 
and/or by improperly identifying where to send the billing.”  (R., p. 51).  “If there is no 
legal obligation to pay the debt; then the plaintiff’s case fails.”  (Id.).  The Court also 
awarded Neumeier attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(1), stating that 
“whether it is a zero summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff or summary judgment in 
favor of the defendant the net result is in favor of the defendant.”  (R., p. 52).  The Court 
also entered judgment in favor of Neumeier, stating that “Defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment is GRANTED” and “Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in the 
amount of $0 is DENIED.”  (R., p. 46). 
MRS subsequently filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on December 9, 
2015, arguing that it was entitled to prejudgment interest.  (R., p. 65).  Neumeier 
responded with a Brief in Opposition to Motion to Set Aside Judgment on December 14, 
2015.  (R., p. 85).  At the hearing on MRS’s motion, MRS presented no case authority on 
the matter, but simply requested that the judgment be set aside so MRS could further 
argue the issue.  (See R., p. 249).  Neumeier’s counsel argued that MRS could not receive 
prejudgment interest when it was not entitled to a judgment in its favor in the first place, 
and further argued that MRS’s counsel should have presented legal authorities at the 
motion to set aside hearing.  (See id.). Over Neumeier’s counsel’s objection, the Court 
ultimately set aside the judgment solely to allow MRS’s counsel to brief the issue of 
prejudgment interest.  (R., p. 89 - 90, 249 - 50).  
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Both parties subsequently presented briefing on the issue of prejudgment 
interest.1  The Court issued an Order on Motion for Summary Judgment Reconsideration 
on February 22, 2016, reinstating and affirming its prior order in favor of Neumeier.  (R., 
p. 118).  In its decision, the Court recognized that MRS was taking a “position 
inconsistent with that previously taken in this case” as it had not previously argued for 
prejudgment interest at summary judgment when it requested a $0 judgment.  (R., p. 
120).  It further found that (a) the “collection agency cannot have greater rights than that 
of the assignor[,]” (b) “[i]nterest is calculated on a percentage of the amount owed and 
not the amount claimed in the complaint.  Any percentage of $0 is still $0[,]” (c) “[f]rom 
a practical perspective, the Court struggles with awarding prejudgment interest on 
amounts which are not even owed[,]” and (d) “Mr. Neumeier did not breach his contract 
to pay and is basically an innocent party in this scenario.”  (R., pp. 120–21).  Judgment 
for Neumeier’s attorney fees and costs was entered on March 3, 2016.  (R., p. 134). 
The Court reaffirmed its judgment in favor of Neumeier in an April 29, 
2016 Order on Motion for Summary Judgment Reconsideration Second.2  (R., p. 155).  
The Court further issued a First Amended Judgment on May 9, 2016, awarding Neumeier 
$6,958.00 in attorney fees and costs.  (R., p. 174).  
                                              
1 Plaintiff submitted a Supplemental Brief in Support of Summary Judgment (Jan. 13, 2016), and Defendant 
submitted a Defendant’s Brief Following Order Setting Aside Judgment (Jan. 22, 2016) (See R. pp. 91, 109). 
2 This opinion was issued in response to Plaintiff’s second effort at a Motion for Reconsideration (Mar. 17, 2016) 
and Defendant’s Objection to Motion for Reconsideration (Apr. 21, 2016). 
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MRS filed an appeal to the District Court on May 6, 2016.3  On December 
13, 2016, the Court, Hon. Joel E. Tingey, entered an Opinion and Order on Appeal, 
affirming the Magistrate Court’s decision in favor of Neumeier and granting Neumeier 
attorney fees and costs on appeal.  (R., p. 284).  
The District Court first ruled against MRS’s claim that the Magistrate Court 
erred in granting Neumeier summary judgment.  The Court found that MRS “failed to list 
or argue the issue” in its first brief on appeal.  (R., p. 281).  Nevertheless, the Court found 
no error in granting summary judgment to Neumeier as there was “no amount . . . due and 
owing” by Neumeier following commonplace insurance adjustments and payments, and 
the doctor’s write-off of the balance.  (R., p. 282). 
Second, the District Court also disagreed with MRS’s claim that the 
Magistrate erred in determining that Neumeier was the prevailing party.  The Court found 
no abuse of discretion in finding that Neumeier prevailed, because when faced with the 
options of ruling in favor of Neumeier by dismissing MRS’s action, or ruling in favor of 
MRS for its requested $0.00, either way “Neumeier owed nothing to MRS.”  (R., p. 283). 
Finally, the District Court disagreed with MRS’s claim that the Magistrate 
Court erred in denying MRS prejudgment interest.  The Court found that MRS was not 
entitled to prejudgment interest because the Magistrate Court did not award MRS a 
                                              
3 Plaintiff subsequently filed an Appellant’s Brief on Appeal on October 11, 2016, Defendant Neumeier responded 
with a Respondent’s Brief on November 7, 2016.  (See R., pp. 217, 240). 
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judgment.  It further found that there was no liquidated amount owed which could be the 
basis of an award of prejudgment interest.  (R., pp. 283-84). 
Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court on January 
20, 2017.  (R., p. 305).  
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review. 
   
When reviewing the decision of a district court sitting in its 
capacity as an appellate court [t]he Supreme Court reviews 
the trial court (magistrate) record to determine whether there 
is substantial and competent evidence to support the 
magistrate's findings of fact and whether the magistrate's 
conclusions of law follow from those findings. If those 
findings are so supported and the conclusions follow 
therefrom and if the district court affirmed the magistrate's 
decision, we affirm the district court's decision as a matter of 
procedure. Thus, this Court does not review the decision of 
the magistrate court. Rather, we are procedurally bound to 
affirm or reverse the decisions of the district court. 
 
Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC. v. MacDonald, 162 Idaho 228, 395 P.3d 1261, 1264 (2017) 
(internal citation omitted). 
B. This Court should affirm the district court’s decision as a matter of 
procedure, because the district court merely affirmed the magistrate court’s 
conclusions of law which followed from supported findings of fact.  
 
  In its opening brief on appeal to the district court, MRS did not challenge 
the magistrate court’s decision to grant summary judgment to Neumeier.  (See R., p. 
220).  At that point, MRS waived any challenge to the magistrate court’s decision on 
summary judgment.  KEB Enterprises, L.P. v. Smedley, 140 Idaho 746, 752, 101 P.3d 
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690 (2004) (“This Court’s longstanding rule is that it will not consider issues raised for 
the first time on appeal.”). 
Nevertheless, summary judgment for Neumeier was proper.  Neumeier did 
not owe or pay the amount claimed in the Complaint.  (R., p. 9). He owed nothing, due to 
an insurance payment and a write-off.  Importantly, MRS recognized that when it 
requested summary judgment for $0.  (R., p. 33).  The magistrate court correctly 
determined that “If there is no legal obligation to pay the debt; then the plaintiff’s case 
fails.”  (R., p. 51).  There was “no genuine issue” as to the only material fact—that 
Neumeier owed nothing—and was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  I.R.C.P. 
56(c).  
Therefore, the trial court record contains substantial and competent 
evidence to support the magistrate’s findings of facts concerning the lack of a genuine 
issue of material fact on summary judgment—that Neumeier owed nothing.  The 
magistrate’s conclusions of law follow from those findings, and the District Court 
properly affirmed the magistrate.  Accordingly, this Court should affirm the District 
Court as a matter of procedure. 
1. The District Court’s holding that insurance must be billed before an 
amount could be considered due and owing was sound. 
 
  The District Court’s written decision never found a “condition precedent” 
or “implied in law condition,” as the Appellant suggests.  What it did find was that there 
was no dispute between the parties that, “once the procedure was performed, the charges 
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were subject to at least two adjustments before any amount could be considered due and 
owing.”  (R., p. 282).  The Court explained: 
First, where Neumeier had medical insurance, the charge was 
subject to a contractual adjustment for the benefit of 
Neumeier and his insurer.  Second, the charge would be 
reduced by payments made by the insurer after the contractual 
adjustment.  Only then, could an amount due and owing by 
Neumeier be determined. 
 As it turned out, once the provider finally billed the 
procedure, the charges were adjusted, the provider received 
payment from the insurer, and the balance was deemed so 
insignificant that the provider waived the balance. 
 
(Id.) 
The District Court’s decision was based on common knowledge and 
common sense.  Insurance companies contract with medical providers to determine an 
agreed-upon price for specific services.  Individuals contract with insurance companies to 
get access to adjusted prices for services and then to have the insurance company pay a 
certain portion of that adjusted price.  Even the most sophisticated individual often has no 
way of knowing what the actual amount of a copayment will be until the medical 
provider’s charges are submitted to and processed by the patient’s insurance for 
contractual adjustments and payments, and an adjusted bill is issued to the patient.  Just 
like any patient, Neumeier expected this process to occur when he gave his insurance 
information to his doctor.   
But due to a series of errors on the part of Dr. Baird and MRS, this process 
never occurred until after suit was filed.  By that time, there was nothing actually due and 
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owing.  The magistrate court found no breach on the part of Neumeier to pay the provider 
(R., p. 120), and the District Court correctly affirmed.  (R., p. 282). 
Because the magistrate court found the actual adjustments and payments by 
insurance and Dr. Baird led to an amount owing of zero, the District Court determined 
the magistrate had correctly granted summary judgment to Neumeier.  MRS has failed to 
show why the District Court was in error in this regard. 
2. The result in this case is a just result, because it rectifies mistakes by 
Dr. Baird and MRS.  
 
  The result in favor of Neumeier was not “unjust,” as suggested by MRS.  
Neumeier did nothing to bring MRS’s litigation upon him. 
  MRS argues, essentially, that it was Neumeier’s responsibility to review his 
Explanation of Benefits to ensure that his insurance was billed, and also Neumeier’s 
responsibility to ensure that he received a bill.  MRS’s argument is not consistent with 
reality.  Neumeier provided his insurance information to Dr. Baird’s office for that very 
purpose—so that his insurance could be billed and he would receive a bill for the balance.  
How was Neumeier to know that there was a bill for his November 2012 colonoscopy if 
he never received one?  It was more reasonable for Neumeier to expect his insurance had 
paid the entire balance.   
  Furthermore, MRS argues that if Neumeier had contacted MRS only one 
day earlier he would not have been sued.  This is nothing but a deflection of 
responsibility.  Neumeier’s response after receiving MRS’s letter—the first 
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correspondence concerning his colonoscopy that happened two and a half years earlier—
was entirely reasonable.  He had never heard of MRS and thought it was a scam, so he 
contacted his doctor.   
  It is important to note here that MRS sent its initial demand letter on April 
4, 2014, but to the wrong address.  (R., p. 269).  Over one year later on April 27, 2015, 
MRS finally sent one, solitary demand and draft complaint to the correct address, which 
Neumeier received only two days before suit was filed.  
  Nothing was unjust in the magistrate court granting summary judgment to 
Neumeier.    
3. The District Court’s decision is consistent with sound reasoning and 
sound public policy.  
 
  MRS’s multiple hypotheticals regarding public policy only serve to gloss 
over the particular facts in this case.  Neumeier never tried to avoid a bill, and did not 
“strategically” wait until after suit was filed to pay any amount or discover the insurance 
and address errors of Dr. Baird and MRS.  He simply never knew about any bill.  When 
he finally became aware of a bill he acted promptly to rectify the problem, but it was 
already too late.  (R., p. 99). 
  Furthermore, as a matter of public policy, it is better for medical service 
providers to be held accountable for responsible billing practices.  Individuals contract 
with health insurance companies specifically to adjust and pay portions of medical 
expenses.  Medical billing is a complex field full of codes, adjustments, and varying 
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insurance contracts.  Patients expect medical providers to competently bill valid 
insurance for their services if insurance is provided.  They also properly expect medical 
providers and collection companies to send insurance-adjusted bills to the proper address, 
with adequate notice.  None of this is unreasonable. 
  When medical providers fail to file insurance claims, send bills to the 
wrong address, and then the collection company compounds the problem by sending only 
one notice to the right address less than thirty (30) days before suing, the patient simply 
should not bear the burden of their mistakes.  It is much better public policy to protect 
innocent consumers from the billing mistakes of other parties. 
C. The magistrate court’s decision that Neumeier was the prevailing party is 
supported by substantial and competent evidence, as Neumeier owed 
nothing to MRS. 
 
The magistrate court determined that Neumeier was the prevailing party: 
Deciding who is the prevailing party is committed to the 
discretion of the court.  Pursuant to Eighteen Mile Ranch v. 
Nord Excavating, 141 Idaho 716, 117 P.3d 130 (2005), the 
court is to consider the final judgment or result of the action 
in relation to the relief sought.  In this case the defendant has 
prevailed.  Whether it is a zero summary judgment in favor of 
the plaintiff or summary judgment in favor of the defendant 
the net result is in favor of the defendant.   
 
(R., p. 52).  As stated by the magistrate court, the determination of who is a prevailing 
party is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.  Houpt v. Wells Fargo Bank, 
Nat’l Assn., 160 Idaho 181, 193, 370 P.3d 384 (2016). The magistrate court recognized 
and perceived that the issue of prevailing party was one of discretion, and it acted within 
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that discretion by an exercise of reason.  The record shows substantial and competent 
evidence for the magistrate court’s decision, which the District Court affirmed.  (R., p. 
284). 
Joseph Magnin Co. v. Schmidt is distinguishable.  Not only is Joseph 
Magnin based on California statute that is non-existent in Idaho law, but, most 
importantly, the facts are completely different.  In Joseph Magnin, the debtor incurred a 
retail installment debt, and was not kept in the dark for over two years as to the existence 
of a debt.  In sharp contrast to the present case, no insurance was involved to pay her debt 
upon being incurred.  Furthermore, the debtor apparently had every opportunity to pay 
the debt prior to suit being filed, but waited until afterward, when she personally tendered 
payment.  89 Cal.App.3d Supp. 7, 152 Cal.Rptr. 523 (Sup. Ct. 1978).     
Here, the facts could not be more different.  Neumeier had no clue about 
the debt, and therefore had no opportunity to correct any error, until he opened his 
mailbox on a Saturday.  Suit was filed two days later on a Monday.  Once Neumeier 
figured out what had happened and called MRS, it was too late.  What’s more, in sharp 
contrast to Joseph Magnin, Neumeier has not paid MRS or Dr. Baird a dime as a result of 
this suit.   
It was fully within the magistrate court’s discretion to decide that 
Neumeier—who paid nothing under the Complaint—was the prevailing party.  
Appellant’s hypotheticals ignore a myriad of factual, important distinctions to the present 
case.  The judiciary is well-equipped to determine relevant matters of law as well as ferret 
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out bad faith actions of debtors.  Based upon substantial and competent evidence, this 
Court should affirm the District Court on the issue of prevailing party. 
D. The magistrate’s decision to deny prejudgment interest is supported by the 
record because MRS received no judgment and there was no liquidated 
amount upon which to base an award of prejudgment interest. 
 
Preliminarily, MRS is incorrect regarding the standard on the award or 
denial of prejudgment interest under Idaho Code § 28-22-104, which is reviewed “for an 
abuse of discretion,” and not “free review,” as suggested by MRS.  Taylor v. Maile, 146 
Idaho 705, 712, 201 P.3d 1282 (2009).  See also Ross v. Ross, 145 Idaho 274, 277, 178 
P.3d 639 (2007) (“Our inquiry in this case, therefore, is whether the district court abused 
its discretion in finding that Rick’s damages were not liquidated or ascertainable by 
mathematical process.”); Dillon v. Montgomery, 138 Idaho 614, 617, 67 P.3d 93 (2003) 
(“The standard of review for an award of prejudgment interest concerns an abuse of 
discretion.”).  There was no abuse of discretion when the magistrate court refused to 
award prejudgment interest to MRS after granting summary judgment to Neumeier.   
1. Prejudgment interest is not available where there is no judgment. 
First, prejudgment interest presupposes that a party has been awarded a 
judgment on the principal claim.  A court cannot award prejudgment interest to a losing 
party.  The District Court recognized this when it found that “[t]he magistrate did not err 
in concluding that since MRS received no judgment, it was not entitled to pre-judgment 
interest.”  (R., p. 283).  This common-sense decision is supported by case law across the 
country.  See Great West Cas. Co. v. Barnick, 542 N.W.2d 400, 402 (Minn. App. 1996) 
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(stating that, where there was no judgment in favor of the requesting party, there could 
not be any prejudgment interest awarded under the statute); see also Warrick v. Graffiti, 
Inc., 550 N.W.2d 303, 310 (Minn. App. 1996) (same); Frontier Pipeline, LLC v. 
Metropolitan Council, 2012 WL 2203016, at *3 (Minn. App. 2012) (same); Griffin v. 
Cutler, 339 P.3d 100, 107 (Utah App. 2014) (stating that “because we affirm the trial 
court’s denial of those fees, Griffin has no judgment to accrue [prejudgment] interest in 
any event.”); Iron Head Const. Inc. v. Gurney, 207 P.3d 1231, 1235 (Utah 2009) (stating 
that “we doubt whether a judicial award of prejudgment interest would ever be 
appropriate on a settlement amount stipulated to by the parties.”); Winters v. Allen, 595 
S.E.2d 813 (N.C. App. 2004) (finding that there was no judgment entered upon which 
prejudgment interest could attach).   
As stated in Hollingshead v. Stanley Works Long Term Disability Plan, 
“Plaintiff has not provided any legal authority, and the Court has found no authority, that 
would support an award of prejudgment interest in the absence of a judgment.  Because 
there is no judgment upon which a prejudgment interest award could be based, Plaintiff’s 
request for prejudgment interest is denied.”  2012 WL 6151994, *3 (D. Colo. 2012); see 
also Kane v. U-Haul Intern. Inc., 218 F. App’x 163, 169 (3rd Cir. 2007) (“As there was 
no judgment in this case, Appellant Kane cannot recover prejudgment interest.”); Brien v. 
Equitable Assur. Soc. of the U.S., 2000 WL 329186, *3 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Finally, Brien 
complains that the district court failed to consider her claim for prejudgment interest.  
Because there was no judgment entered for Brien, the district court did not abuse its 
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discretion in failing to award Brien interest on a zero judgment.”). MRS still has not 
shown that the District Court’s decision in this regard was incorrect. 
2. Prejudgment interest is also not appropriate where the amount of 
liability is $0, or is a moving target. 
 
Second, Neumeier paid nothing on MRS’s claim. This is consistent with 
MRS’s request for judgment of $0, the magistrate court’s statement that “any percentage 
of $0 is still $0” (R., p. 121), and the District Court’s decision that “there was no 
liquidated amount owed which could be the basis of an award of pre-judgment interest.”  
(R., p. 284).  This is just as well, since if Dr. Baird had billed insurance and Dr. Baird and 
MRS had sent notice to the correct address, this lawsuit likely would never have 
happened.  
MRS’s attempt to conjure a number for prejudgment interest continues to 
assume that MRS could be awarded prejudgment interest without a judgment, that it 
should have been awarded prejudgment interest based upon an ever-changing and 
unliquidated medical bill amount not yet submitted to insurance for adjustments or 
payments, or that it could have been awarded pre-judgment interest on a judgment of $0. 
MRS has provided no competent authority or facts to support any of these positions.  To 
add to the confusion on MRS’s claim, the prejudgment interest it claims it is entitled to in 
its Appellant’s Brief on Appeal ($114.86) is different than the amount it claimed on 
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appeal to the District Court ($315.16) (see R. p. 225), or even the amount it requested on 
summary judgment, which was nothing.4  (R. p. 33). 
 The facts were clear to the magistrate court and District Court—that the 
amount owed by Neumeier was not known until the bill was processed by Neumeier’s 
insurance, and by that time Dr. Baird had waived the copayment.  Nothing was owed, and 
nothing was paid by Neumeier.  It is regrettable that it took until after suit for this process 
to finally occur, but this was not Neumeier’s fault. 
3. State Drywall does not stand for MRS’s argument that prejudgment 
interest can be awarded without a judgment on the merits. 
 
 MRS cites to a Nevada court case, State Drywall, Inc. v. Rhodes Design & 
Development, 127 P.3d 1082 (Nev. 2006), and claims that it supports MRS’s failed 
argument that prejudgment interest should be awarded even if the Plaintiff does not 
receive a judgment on the merits.  It does not. 
 The context of the case tells the whole story.  In State Drywall, the 
subcontractor was not paid for part of the work on a housing development, and sued the 
general contractor.  While the litigation was pending, the general contractor made two 
separate payments on the contract.  The general contractor then made an offer of 
                                              
4 Incidentally, the magistrate court found that MRS was judicially estopped from requesting prejudgment interest 
because it argued for $0 on summary judgment.  (R., p. 120). 
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judgment on the remaining amount due and owing, which offer was rejected by the 
subcontractor. 
 Following trial, the court found the general contractor had breached its 
contract with the subcontractor, and awarded the subcontractor judgment in its favor for 
the outstanding amount owing.  The court also awarded prejudgment interest on the 
judgment, which did not include prejudgment interest on the two payments made by the 
general contractor to the subcontractor during the litigation. 
 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the trial court and 
concluded that the subcontractor was also entitled to prejudgment interest on the amounts 
that were paid during litigation, stating that “prejudgment interest should be calculated 
for ‘all money’ owed under the contract from the date it becomes due until the date it is 
paid or an offer of judgment is made.”  State Drywall, 127 P.3d at 117.  
State Drywall simply does not support a claim for prejudgment interest 
without a supporting judgment on the principal obligation.  In State Drywall, the 
subcontractor received a judgment on the merits in its favor.  In this case, MRS did not 
receive a judgment on the principal obligation in its favor.  In State Drywall, the 
defendant deliberately deprived the plaintiff of its funds, which was a basis for awarding 
prejudgment interest.  No such action occurred here.   
MRS cannot point to a single case which supports its claim that it is entitled 
to prejudgment interest absent a judgment in its favor on the principal obligation. 
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The magistrate court’s and District Court’s decisions on prejudgment 
interest were based on substantial and competent evidence, and should be affirmed. 
E. It is good policy to allow debtors such as Neumeier to escape the errors of 
his doctor and collection company without harm.  
 
Finally, more than once MRS raises unsupported policy concerns about 
debtors paying after suit and being found to be the prevailing party or avoiding 
prejudgment interest.  It should be noted that MRS has cited to nothing to support any 
contention that the magistrate court had to consider public policy when making its 
decision. The facts were clear—Neumeier owed nothing and paid nothing, and was the 
prevailing party. 
The magistrate court’s decision was made based upon the unique facts in 
the Neumeier case.  As recognized by the magistrate court, a series of errors by Dr. Baird 
and MRS led up to the filing of suit.  Neumeier’s plight is the exact opposite of the debtor 
who refuses to pay a known debt until after suit.  As such, MRS’s policy concerns are ill-
founded. 
Furthermore, the real policy concern in this case should be the protection of 
individuals such as Neumeier from the errors that occurred here, which continue to cost 
him attorney fees and costs.  No one should have had to go through what Neumeier has 
had to go through and continues to go through in this case. 
This issue is best illustrated by the provisions of the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act (FDCPA) (15 U.S.C.A. § 1692 et seq.), which was specifically passed to 
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protect consumers from the issues seen in this case.  Section 1692g(a) requires debt 
collectors to give a debtor a written notice and a thirty (30) day period “after receipt of 
the notice” to respond after an initial communication.  The plain language of the Act 
requires the debt collector send the written notice to a valid and proper address where the 
consumer may actually receive it.  Ponce v. BCA Fin. Servs., 467 F. Appx. 806, 807–08 
(11th Cir. 2012). 
Contrary to the misstatement in the Complaint, there were no plural 
“requests and demands” for payment.  (R., p. 9).  There was no opportunity to “offer[] 
any reason or objection to the bill.”  (Id.).  The demand letter dated April 27 was the first 
communication MRS ever sent to a valid address.  The FDCPA notice contained in the 
April 27 letter from MRS, received on May 16, told Neumeier that “[u]nless you dispute 
the validity of the above-described debt, or a portion thereof, within 30 days of your 
receipt of this letter, we will assume that the debt is valid.”  (R., p. 11).  Only two days 
later, and well before the statutory thirty days had expired, MRS had already filed suit.     
Public policy should never hold a medical patient responsible for his 
doctor’s or a debt collector’s errors.  The District Court’s decision on appeal should be 
affirmed. 
F. Neumeier is entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
Idaho Code § 12-120(1) provides for an award of attorney fees to the 
prevailing party where the amount in controversy was less than $35,000.00.  Section 
12-120(3) provides for an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in “any civil 
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action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, negotiable instrument, 
guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or 
services and any commercial transaction[.]” 
Neumeier is entitled to recover its attorney fees and costs on this appeal, 
pursuant to both of these statutes and Rules 40 and 41 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.  The 
amount at issue was clearly less than $35,000.00, and concerned payment on a contract 
for services.  
  In the alternative, Neumeier is entitled to recover his fees and costs 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121.  Attorney fees are awarded on appeal under Idaho Code 
§ 12-121 “if the appeal was brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without 
foundation” or if the appeal merely asks the appellate court to “second guess” the lower 
court opinion.  Frantz v. Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP, 161 Idaho 60, 66, 383 
P.3d 1230 (2016).  
  MRS’s first appeal asked the District Court to second-guess the sound, 
discretionary decision of the magistrate court.  The District Court found no abuse of 
discretion.  This appeal is no different.  MRS is asking the Court to second-guess both the 
magistrate and District Court.  Neumeier is therefore also entitled to his attorney fees on 
appeal under Idaho Code § 12-121.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
  Dr. Baird’s office should have submitted the bill for the colonoscopy to 
Neumeier’s insurance company back in 2012.  It also should have sent invoices to 
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Neumeier’s correct address over the course of two years following the procedure.  
Furthermore, it should have, at the very least, called Neumeier to see if its invoices were 
being received.   
  Once MRS realized that the address was incorrect, it should have done 
more than rely upon a single demand to the correct address before filing suit.   
  Neumeier is the victim of these errors.  Once he learned for the very first 
time that Dr. Baird’s office and MRS had made these mistakes, he acted quickly.  
Insurance was billed.  The balance was waived. 
  Neumeier owed nothing to MRS, and paid nothing to MRS.  The magistrate 
court did not err by granting Neumeier summary judgment.  Furthermore, it did not abuse 
its discretion by determining that Neumeier was the prevailing party, or by denying MRS 
any prejudgment interest.  The District Court’s decision affirms the magistrate court, and 
therefore this Court should affirm the District Court’s decision as a matter of procedure. 
For the reasons stated herein, this Court should affirm the Opinion and 
Order on Appeal, and grant Neumeier his attorney fees and costs incurred in this appeal. 
  Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of August, 2017. 
      HOPKINS RODEN CROCKETT 
       HANSEN & HOOPES, PLLC 
 
 
       By: /s/ Sean J. Coletti    
   Sean J. Coletti  
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL, HAND DELIVERY 
OR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION 
 
  I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was 
on this date served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set out below their 
name, either by mailing, hand delivery, or by telecopying to them a true and correct copy 
of said document in a properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, postage 
prepaid; by hand delivery to them; or by facsimile transmission. 
 
  DATED this 23rd day of August, 2017. 
 
       
/s/ Sean J. Coletti     
      Sean J. Coletti 
 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, 
PLLC 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Counsel for Medical Recovery Services, 
LLC 
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